A Secure Multiple Elliptic Curves Digital Signature Algorithm for
  Blockchain by Bi, Wei et al.
A Secure Multiple Elliptic Curves Digital Signature 
Algorithm for Blockchain 
Wei Bi*, Xiaoyun Jia, Maolin Zheng 
Seele Tech Corporation, San Francisco, USA 
weibi@seelenet.com 
Abstract: Most cryptocurrency systems or systems based on blockchain technol-
ogy are currently using the elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) 
on the secp256k1 curve, which is susceptible to backdoors implemented by the 
curve creator (secp256k1). The paper proposes a multiple elliptic curves digital 
signature algorithm (MECDSA), which allows not only for setting the number of 
elliptic curves according to practical security requirements, but also for editing 
the parameters of each elliptic curve. The performance analysis proves that the 
scheme is secure and efficient, and can avoid any backdoors implemented by 
curve creators. We suggest that the systems based on blockchain should operate 
in two elliptic curves considering the contradiction between security and effi-
ciency. 
Keywords: Digital Signature, Blockchain, Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP). 
1 Introduction 
Digital signatures1-2 are used to detect unauthorized modifications to data and to au-
thenticate the identity of the signer. The recipient of signed message can use a digital 
signature as evidence to demonstrate to a third party that the signature was generated 
by the claimed signer. Digital signatures uses a combination of hash functions and pub-
lic key cryptography. Firstly, the message digest is created using a hash function. The 
signature is created by encrypting the message digest using the signer’s private key. 
Anyone can use the signer’s public key and the same hash function to verify the re-
ceived signature. 
Until now, most cryptocurrency systems3-5 or systems based on blockchain technol-
ogy6-7 have used in elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (ECDSA)8-10, which is 
based on secp256k111. Secp256k1 was almost never used before Bitcoin became pop-
ular, but it is now gaining in popularity due to several beneficial properties. Most com-
monly-used curves have random structure, but secp256k1 was constructed in a unique, 
non-random way which allows for especially efficient computation. As a result, it is 
often more than 30% faster than other curves if the implementation is sufficiently opti-
mized. However, it cannot prevent the curve's creator from inserting any backdoors into 
the curve. So we propose a multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm 
                                   
(MECDSA), which is more secure and can avoid any backdoors. In MECDSA scheme, 
the user cannot only choose the number of elliptic curves according to practical security 
requirements, but also can customize the curve by editing its parameters. 
The multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm serves four purposes. Firstly, 
the signature proves that the owner of the private key, who is by implication the owner 
of the funds, has authorized the spending of the funds. Secondly, the proof of authori-
zation is undeniable. Thirdly, the signature proves that the transaction has not and can-
not be modified by anyone after it has been signed. Fourthly, the signature scheme can 
avoid any backdoors in the ECDSA curve. 
In section 2, we summarize existing elliptic curve digital signature algorithm 
(ECDSA). In section 3, we propose a multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm 
(MECDSA). In section 4, we analyze the performance of MECDSA from its validity, 
security and efficiency. 
2 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
An elliptic curve E over a finite prime field Fp is defined by the short Weierstrass equa-
tion,  
E: 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 
where 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐹𝑝, 4𝑎3 + 27𝑏2 ≠ 0(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑝), and 𝑝 is a large prime. 𝑃 is a randomly se-
lected elements on the elliptic curve E, called the base point, whose order 𝑛 is a large 
prime that makes 𝑛𝑃 = 𝑂 , where 𝑂  is the zero element of the field 𝐸(𝐹𝑝),  𝑛 >
2160, 𝑛 > 4√𝑝. 
A signer chooses a random number 𝑑 ∈ [1, 𝑛] as a private key, and computes public 
key Q = 𝑑𝑃. 
2.1 ECDSA Signature Generation 
A signer signs the message 𝑚 according to the following steps: 
Step 1: Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻(𝑚), where 𝐻 is the secure hash algorithm. 
Step 2: Select a random integer 𝑘 from [1, 𝑛 − 1], and compute 𝑘𝑃 = (𝑥, 𝑦). 
Step 3: Compute 𝑟 = 𝑥(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛). If 𝑟 = 0, go back to step 2 and reselect 𝑘. 
Step 4: Compute 𝑠 = 𝑘−1(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑟)(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛). If 𝑠 = 0, go back to step 2 and reselect 
𝑘. 
Then the signature on the message m is the pair (𝑟, 𝑠). 
2.2 ECDSA Signature Verification 
Anyone can check to see if the signature (𝑟, 𝑠) of the message 𝑚 is valid by completing 
the following steps: 
Step 1: Verify that 𝑟 and 𝑠 are integers in [1, 𝑛 − 1]. If not, the signature is invalid. 
Step 2: Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻(𝑚), where 𝐻 is a same hash function used in signature gen-
eration. 
Step 3: Compute 𝑤 = 𝑠−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛). 
                                   
Step 4: Compute 𝑢 = 𝑒𝑤(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛), 𝑣 = 𝑟𝑤(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛). 
Step 5: Compute 𝑅 = 𝑢𝑃 + 𝑣𝑄 = (𝑥, 𝑦). 
The signature is valid if 𝑟 = 𝑥(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛), or otherwise it is invalid. 
The signer can obviously operate the ECDSA 𝑡 times (t-ECDSA), and get the signa-
ture (𝑟1, 𝑠1, 𝑟2, 𝑠2, … , 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡 , ) in 𝑡 elliptic curves, but this will make the length of the sig-
nature long. To fix this, we present a secure multiple elliptic curves digital signature 
algorithm (MECDSA) in the next section, which can reduce the length of signature. 
3 Multiple Elliptic Curves Digital Signature Algorithm 
In this section, we propose a secure multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm 
(MECDSA), which can avoid any backdoors in the curve used by secp256k1. In this 
signature scheme, the user can not only choose the number of elliptic curves according 
to practical security requirements, but also can choose the curve by changing its param-
eters. 
The parameters of MECDSA are same as ECDSA. There are 𝑡  elliptic curves 
𝐸𝑖: 𝑦
2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑖𝑥 + 𝑏𝑖 over finite prime field F𝑝𝑖, 𝑃𝑖  is the base point whose order is 
𝑛𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡.  
In MECDSA, the signer chooses the number of curve and the parameters of the 
curves. After this, the signer chooses t random numbers 𝑑𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛𝑖] as a private key, 
and computes the public key 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑃𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
3.1 MECDSA Signature Generation 
A signer signs the message m according to the following steps (fig. 1): 
Step 1: Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻(𝑚), where 𝐻 is the secure hash algorithm. 
Step 2: Select random integer 𝑘𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛𝑖 − 1], computer 𝑘𝑖𝑃𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖1, 𝑦𝑖1), where 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
Step 3: Compute 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖). If 𝑟𝑖 = 0, go back to step 2 and reselect 𝑘𝑖, where 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
Step 4: Compute 𝑟 = 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑡. If 𝑟 = 0(mod𝑛𝑖), return step 2, where 𝑖 =
1,2, … , 𝑡. 
Step 5: Compute 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖
−1[𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟](𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖). If 𝑠𝑖 = 0, go back to step 2 and rese-
lect 𝑘𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
Then (𝑟, 𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑡) is taken as the signature of the message 𝑚. 
3.2 MECDSA Signature Verification 
Anyone can check whether or not the signature (𝑟, 𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑡) of 𝑚 is valid by com-
pleting the following steps: 
Step 1: Verify that 𝑟 and 𝑠𝑖 are integers in [t, 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + ⋯ + 𝑛𝑡 − 𝑡] and [1, 𝑛𝑖 − 1] 
respectively, where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑡. If not, refuse the signature 
Step 2: Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻(𝑚), where 𝐻 is a same hash function used in signature gen-
eration. 
                                   
Step 3: Compute 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖), where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
Step 4: Compute 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑒𝑤𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖), 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑟𝑤𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖), where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
Step 5: Compute 𝑅𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑄𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖), where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
Step 6: Compute 𝑟′𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖), where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡.  
If r = 𝑟′1 + 𝑟′2 + ⋯ 𝑟′𝑡 , accept the signature, otherwise, refuse the signature. 
Message m
Private key di
e=H(m)
Random numeber ki
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si=0
Sig(m)=(r,s1,s2,…,st)
End
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Fig.1 MECDSA Signature Algorithm 
4 Performance Analysis 
In the section, we analyze the performance of MECDSA from different perspectives, 
including validity, security and efficiency. 
4.1 Validity Analysis 
According MECDSA signature generation and signature verification algorithm in 
MECDSA, we can get:  
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑒𝑤𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖) = 𝑒𝑠𝑖
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖) = 𝑒𝑘𝑖[𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟]
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖) 
                                   
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑟𝑤𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖) = 𝑟𝑠𝑖
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖) = 𝑟𝑘𝑖[𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟]
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖) 
So  
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑄𝑖  
      = [𝑒𝑘𝑖(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟)
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖)]𝑃𝑖 + [𝑟𝑘𝑖(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟)
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖)]𝑄𝑖 
      = [𝑒𝑘𝑖(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟)
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖)]𝑃𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖[𝑟𝑘𝑖(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟)
−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖)]𝑃𝑖 
      = [𝑘𝑖(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟)
−1(𝑒 + 𝑑𝑖𝑟)(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖)]𝑃𝑖  
      = (𝑘𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖))𝑃𝑖 
      = 𝑘𝑖𝑃𝑖  
      = (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) 
So 𝑟′𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑛𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖  and r = 𝑟′1 + 𝑟′2 + ⋯ 𝑟
′
𝑡 = 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 + ⋯ 𝑟𝑡 , where 𝑖 =
1,2, … , 𝑡. Therefore, we prove the correctness of MECDSA. 
4.2 Security Analysis 
The security of cryptosystems using elliptic curves hinges on the intractability of dis-
crete logarithm problem in the algebraic system. Historically, this problem has received 
considerable attention from leading mathematicians and cryptologists around the 
world12-14. Unlike the case of the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields, there is no 
subexponential-time algorithm known for the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem 
(ECDLP). The best algorithm known to data takes exponential time. 
The security of the proposed MECDSA is based on the difficulty of solving the 
ECDLP, and is mainly faced with the following attacks. MECDSA security is presented 
by the following analysis of attacks: 
(1) The attacker wishes to obtain private key 𝑑1, 𝑑2, … , 𝑑𝑡 using all information that 
is available from the scheme. In this case, the attacker can compute 𝑟1, 𝑟2, … 𝑟𝑡 accord-
ing to the known public key 𝑄1, 𝑄2, … , 𝑄𝑡 , signature (𝑟, 𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑡) and message m, 
and can further compute 𝐾𝑖 where 𝐾𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖𝑃𝑖 . If an attacker wanted to obtain the private 
key, he would need to solved 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑃𝑖  or 𝐾𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖𝑃𝑖 respectively for 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑘𝑖, which 
is clearly infeasible because the difficulty of solving the ECDLP, where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑡. 
(2) The attacker wishes to obtain the private key 𝑑𝑖1, 𝑑𝑖2, … , 𝑑𝑖𝑡1 from a partial pri-
vate key 𝑑𝑗1, 𝑑𝑗2, … , 𝑑𝑗𝑡2 , where 𝑡1 + 𝑡2 = 𝑡 . When the attacker can obtain 
𝑑𝑗1, 𝑑𝑗2, … , 𝑑𝑗𝑡2  because of the backdoors in 𝑡2(𝑡2 < t)  elliptic curves, he needs to 
solved 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑃𝑖  or 𝐾𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖𝑃𝑖  respectively for 𝑑𝑖  and 𝑘𝑖 , which is clearly infeasible 
because the difficulty of solving the ECDLP, where 𝑖 = 𝑖1, 𝑖2, … , 𝑖𝑡1. 
4.3 Efficiency Analysis 
The computational cost of the proposed MECDSA is mainly determined by addition 
and multiplication operation in the elliptic curve and inverse operation in the finite 
prime field. Assume that 𝑡 is the number of elliptic curves and 𝑙(𝑛𝑖) is the length of the 
order 𝑛𝑖 of the base point 𝑃𝑖 . Table 1 gives the efficiency analysis of MECDSA and t-
ECDSA, including the computational cost and signature length. 
                                   
Table 1: Efficiency comparison 
Method Process Fq EC Length of Sig. 
  
Add. Mut. Inv. Add. Mul. 
t-ECDSA Sig. Gen. t 2t t 0 t 2 ∑ 𝑙(𝑛𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
 
Sig. Ver. 0 2t 
t t 2t 
MECDSA Sig. Gen. 2t-1 2t 
t 0 t max(𝑙(𝑛1), 𝑙(𝑛2), … , 𝑙(𝑛𝑡)) +
𝑡 − 1+∑ 𝑙(𝑛𝑖)
𝑡
𝑖=1  
 
Sig. Ver. t-1 2t t t 2t 
5 Conclusion 
In order to avoid backdoor in the ECDSA curve of cryptocurrency systems, the paper 
proposes a multiple elliptic curves digital signature algorithm (MECDSA), which al-
lows the signer to not only choose the number of elliptic curves, but also specify the 
parameters of each elliptical curve. Our elliptic curves are not limited to the curve P-
256 of national institute of standards and technology (NIST)15, SM2 of Chinese state 
cryptography administration16, secp256r111 and secp256k1 in standards for efficient 
cryptography, and others. We suggest that the systems based on blockchain should 
choose two elliptic curves considering the contradiction between security and effi-
ciency. 
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Appendix 
1 Curve P-256 of National Institute of Standards and Technology 
For each prime 𝑝, a pseudo-random curve E: 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 − 3𝑥 + 𝑏(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑝) of prime order 
n is listed. The following parameters are given: 
The prime modulus p: 
p=1157920892103562487626974469494075735300861434152903141955336313088
67097853951 
The order n: 
n=1157920892103562487626974469494075735299969552241357603424222590610
68512044369 
The coefficient b (satisfying 𝑏2𝑐 = −27𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑝): 
b = 5ac635d8 aa3a93e7 b3ebbd55 769886bc 651d06b0 cc53b0f6 3bce3c3e 27d2604b 
The base point P in compressed form is: 
P=02 6b17d1f2 e12c4247 f8bce6e5 63a440f2 77037d81 2deb33a0 f4a13945 d898c296 
and in uncompressed form is: 
P=04 6b17d1f2 e12c4247 f8bce6e5 63a440f2 77037d81 2deb33a0 f4a13945 d898c296 
4fe342e2 fe1a7f9b 8ee7eb4a 7c0f9e16 2bce3357 6b315ece cbb64068 37bf51f5 
The cofactor h: 
h=01 
2 SM2 of Chinese State Cryptography Administration 
The elliptic curve equation is E: 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏, and the parameters of the equation 
are as following: 
The prime modulus p: 
                                   
p=fffffffe ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff 
The coefficient a: 
a= fffffffe ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 00000000 ffffffff fffffffc 
The coefficient b: 
b=28e9fa9e 9d9f5e34 4d5a9e4b cf6509a7 f39789f5 15ab8f92 ddbcbd41 4d940e93 
The order n: 
n= fffffffe ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff 7203df6b 21c6052b 53bbf409 39d54123 
The base point P in compressed form is: 
P=02 32c4ae2c 1f198119 5f990446 6a39c994 8fe30bbf f2660be1 715a4589 334c74c7 
and in uncompressed form is: 
P=04 32c4ae2c 1f198119 5f990446 6a39c994 8fe30bbf f2660be1 715a4589 334c74c7 
bc3736a2 f4f6779c 59bdcee3 6b692153 d0a9877c c62a4740 02df32e5 2139f0a0 
The cofactor h: 
h=01 
3 secp256r1 of standards for efficient cryptography 
The verifiably random elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp secp256r1 are speci-
fied by the extuple T = (p, a, b, G, n, h) where the finite field Fp is defined by: 
p=ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff fffffff 
The curve E: 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 over Fp is defined by: 
a=ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff ffffffc 
b=5ac635d8 aa3a93e7 b3ebbd55 769886bc 651d06b0 cc53b0f6 3bce3c3e 7d2604b 
E was chosen verifiably at random as specified in ANSI X9.62 from the seed: 
S=c49d3608 86e70493 6a6678e1 139d26b7 819f7e90 
The base point P in compressed form is: 
P=03 6b17d1f2 e12c4247 f8bce6e5 63a440f2 77037d81 2deb33a0 f4a13945 d898c296 
and in uncompressed form is: 
P=04 6b17d1f2 e12c4247 f8bce6e5 63a440f2 77037d81 2deb33a0 f4a13945 d898c296 
4fe342e2 fe1a7f9b 8ee7eb4a 7c0f9e16 2bce3357 6b315ece cbb64068 37bf51f5 
The order n is: 
n=ffffffff 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff bce6faad a7179e84 f3b9cac2 fc632551 
The cofactor h is: 
h=01 
4 secp256k1 of standards for efficient cryptography 
The elliptic curve domain parameters over Fp associated with a Koblitz curve 
secp256k1 are specified by the sextuple T = (p, a, b, G, n, h), where the finite field Fp 
is defined by: 
p= ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe ffffc2f 
The curve E: 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 over Fp is defined by: 
a=0 
b=7 
The base point P in compressed form is: 
                                   
P=02 79be667e f9dcbbac 55a06295 ce870b07 029bfcdb 2dce28d9 59f2815b 16f81798 
and in uncompressed form is: 
P=04 79be667e f9dcbbac 55a06295 ce870b07 029bfcdb 2dce28d9 59f2815b 16f81798 
483ada77 26a3c465 5da4fbfc 0e1108a8 fd17b448 a6855419 9c47d08f fb10d4b8 
Finally the order n of G and the cofactor are: 
n=ffffffff ffffffff ffffffff fffffffe baaedce6 af48a03b bfd25e8c d0364141 
h=01 
